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A major issue in the literature on the economics of education is: Do 
schools make a difference? Do different schools produce different out 
comes, and if so, why? Numerous studies have analyzed this question 
at the primary and secondary levels, usually using cognitive learning as 
the output variable. Only a small number of studies have tackled this 
issue at the college level, where the research interest has largely 
focused on the returns to quantity rather than quality. These studies 
have used future earnings or occupational status as the output variable, 
consistent with the premise that an important function of education is 
to improve one's position in the labor market. Colleges can enhance 
productivity and earnings by imparting general or specific skills, or 
information that helps students make good choices about their future 
career directions. Studies of college quality, like those of the quality of 
primary and secondary schools, have come up with ambiguous and 
contradictory results.
For example, in his analysis of the NBER Thorndike earnings data 
(for a group of World War II veterans whose earnings were measured 
in 1969), Wales (1973) found that graduates of top colleges (as mea 
sured by the Gourman rating, which is related to selectivity) received 
significantly higher earnings. Using the same data, Wachtel (1976) 
found that college expenditures per student exert a positive effect on 
earnings, and Solmon and Wachtel (1975) found that college type, as 
measured by Carnegie classification, also matters. According to Reed 
and Miller (1970), college rank (as measured by the average verbal and
in
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mathematical aptitude of entering freshmen) had a positive effect on 
the weekly earnings of a sample of men surveyed by the Census 
Bureau in 1967. However, most of the students covered by these stud 
ies were in college prior to the vast expansion of the 1960s, which 
changed the nature of the higher education industry. In these regres 
sions, usually only one college characteristic is specified as an indica 
tor of quality. And only a small set of student background variables is 
included. Astin and others have argued that the impact of college qual 
ity is minimal once these are controlled (Astin 1968; Griffin and Alex 
ander 1978). Indeed, a study by Alwin (1974) found only a small 
relationship between occupational success and college characteristics, 
after controlling for student composition.
One key problem encountered by all these studies has been the diffi 
culty in obtaining detailed information about student characteristics, in 
order to control for ability, family influence, and prior education, 
which is essential if the purpose is to calculate the value added by the 
school. Longitudinal data tracking the individuals in a cohort are par 
ticularly scarce. Another problem has been the difficulty in obtaining 
disaggregated information about schools. A final problem is that we 
rarely have data about the student's college experience and academic 
achievement, such as choice of courses, major and GPA, that may 
influence earnings. (See Hanushek 1986, for a thorough analysis of 
these and other problems that beset the "school effectiveness" and 
"educational productivity" literature.)
In this paper we exploit a uniquely rich data set, the National Longi 
tudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS-72) and the Post- 
secondary Education Transcript Study (PETS), to overcome these 
problems and answer the questions: Does it matter which college a stu 
dent attends? If it matters, which college characteristics lead to higher 
earnings? Do higher expenditures or a more selective student body 
imply superior results? Which is better, a large research university or a 
small liberal arts college? Does the public/private typology make a dif 
ference, as some feel it does at the secondary level? We also examine 
the impact on earnings of student behavior while at college. Are aca 
demic achievement and curriculum choice harbingers of future 
achievement? (For a preliminary analysis of these issues see James, 
Alsalam, Conaty, and To 1989.)
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We begin by setting forth our methodology, including our model, 
data sources, choice of variables, and statistical technique. In the sec 
ond part of this paper we present our findings concerning the effects of 
college characteristics, and in the third we give our results concerning 
the effects of other aspects of the college experience, particularly 
choice of major. The fourth section is a summary of our results and 
their limitations.
Briefly, our fixed-effects model shows that the particular college 
attended does indeed make a difference, explaining 17 to 29 percent of 
the variance in earnings. However, we are unable to tie this college 
effect down to observable college characteristics, which taken as a 
group explain only 1 to 2 percent of the variance in earnings. These 
effects exist, but they are very small.
Moreover, whether fixed effects or observable characteristics are 
measured, the college effect becomes statistically insignificant once 
family background, labor market experience, and major are controlled. 
To a large extent the world perceives a differential college effect 
because it is perceiving "gross output" rather than "value-added" and 
is not taking account of the many other factors that affect earnings, 
some of which are correlated with choice of college.
In contrast to these negative findings about college effects, we find 
that what a student does while in college strongly affects future earn 
ings, even after all the other variables in our model are controlled. 
Apparently, direct measures of skill acquisition matter more than indi 
rect screening by college characteristics.
Methodology
The Model
As is well known, there are multiple outputs of higher education, 
including knowledge gained, earning power enhanced, values formed, 
amenities consumed, and research undertaken, all of which enter into 
student and social utility functions. In this paper we concentrate on one 
output of education—future earnings—as a function of all the jointly 
supplied inputs.
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We model earnings (Y) as a function of four sets of variables:
Xj = a set of individual characteristics including family background 
and prior academic achievement;
X2 = a set of institutional characteristics, including college expendi 
tures, college organization, and student body composition, which 
determine the value added by the college;
X3 = higher educational experience variables that are chosen by the 
student but may be influenced by the college;
X4 = labor market variables, such as experience and weeks worked per 
year.
Our focus here is on the impact on earnings of institutional characteris 
tics and other aspects of the higher educational experience.
Before presenting our results we outline the data and expected 
direction of causal relationships, and discuss our treatment of several 
methodological problems.
Data Sources and Sample
Information about student characteristics, earnings, and other labor 
market variables comes from the National Longitudinal Study of the 
High School Senior Class of 1972, which follows this cohort through 
further education and into the labor market. This survey gives detailed 
information about family background, education, and academic 
achievement prior to entering college, as well as subsequent labor mar 
ket experience. The fifth follow-up in 1986 includes 12,841 men and 
women. Two-thirds of the total had some postsecondary education and 
one-fourth had received their college degree. We deal in this paper 
with a subset of the latter group, the 1,321 males whose graduating 
institution was identified, who took at least sixty credit hours in that 
institution, and who worked for an employer at least twenty hours per 
week in 1985. Most of them had been out of college for seven to nine 
years.
There are 499 colleges and universities in our subsample. Over half 
are Ph.D.-granting institutions, three-quarters are public, and enroll 
ment size varies from 288 to 50,011. Many of the smaller colleges 
enrolled only one member of our sample, but 285 institutions (typi-
College Choice, Academic Achievement and Future Earnings 115
cally the larger ones) had two or more observations, totaling 1,107 
male students; we used these as a subsample for the fixed-effects mod 
els. We obtained most of our data about the characteristics of these col 
leges and universities from the Higher Education General Information 
Survey (HEGIS), which conducts annual surveys of postsecondary 
four-year institutions; we chose 1975 as a representative year for our 
cohort. This was supplemented by data from Cass and Birnbaum 
(1975).
Finally, the Postsecondary Education Transcript Study gave us the 
college transcripts of each student, from which we derived the college 
experience variables. None of the previous studies on college quality 
has had access to such detailed information about curriculum choices 
and achievement in college. All financial data were inflated to 1986 
prices using the Consumer Price Index.
Institutional Characteristics
We view the college consumer as purchasing a set of characteristics 
that is experienced uniformly by all students at a given institution. In 
our fixed-effects model we identify each college by a dummy variable 
that captures all its observable plus unobservable characteristics. In our 
ordinary least squares (OLS) models we examine the observable char 
acteristics in greater detail. This section describes some of the observ 
able variables we use.
The school effectiveness literature has been particularly interested 
in the influence of "expenditures per student." If colleges were compet 
itive, privately financed, profit-maximizing institutions, and if consum 
ers cared primarily about future earnings and had full information 
about educational production functions, higher costs would have to be 
covered by higher prices which would be sustainable only if they led to 
higher future earnings. However, the institutions in our sample are 
public or nonprofit, much of their revenues coming from state legisla 
tors or donors, and devices such as accreditation procedures and repu 
tation limit entry. Under these circumstances, colleges may have 
potential profits with which to pursue their own discretionary goals, 
their nonconsumer funders may support multiple objectives, and stu 
dents may be uninformed about college effects or may care about 
many outputs of education besides future productivity. As a result of all
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these factors, we do not have a strong a priori reason to expect a sys 
tematic relationship between college expenditures and future earnings.
To investigate the expenditure effect, we started with the idea of 
decomposing college spending into its separate components—expendi 
tures on instruction, research, institutional support services, and finan 
cial aid. However, strong multi-collinearity precluded this strategy. 
Therefore we used, alternatively, the most inclusive measure, logged 
educational and general spending per student (LXPS); the most 
directly relevant measure, logged instructional expenditures per stu 
dent (LINSXPS); and a combination of inputs—the student-faculty 
ratio (S/F) and average faculty salaries (FACSAL). Ideally, we would 
have adjusted our measures of monetary inputs for regional cost differ 
ences, but unfortunately we did not have access to the detailed city-by- 
city, education-relevant cost-of-living index that would be necessary to 
convert these monetary inputs into real inputs. However, our experi 
ments with S/F captured the basic idea. As it turned out, the results for 
all the cost variables were very similar, and those with LXPS are pre 
sented in this paper.
We wanted to investigate whether institutions under public versus 
private control, with research versus teaching missions, and with pre 
dominantly graduate versus undergraduate student bodies, behave dif 
ferently. Theory suggests that such differences exist, but the direction 
and magnitude are ambiguous. For example, private institutions may 
utilize their resources more efficiently than public ones and may bene 
fit from a halo effect in the labor market or on the other hand may have 
to devote substantial resources to fundraising (see James 1989). The 
presence of doctoral students may lead to a diversion of resources 
away from undergraduates or conversely may add a pool of cheap 
labor available to teach undergraduates. And similarly, research may 
enhance or detract from the undergraduate teaching function (see 
James 197$; James and Neuberger 1981). These possible effects were 
captured by entering private colleges, Ph.D.-awarding institutions, and 
Research Type I Universities (Carnegie classification) as dummies 
(PRIV, PRIV*E, PHD, RES) or, alternatively, as interactions with 
expenditures per student, and by including the percent of graduate stu 
dents in total enrollment (PGRAD). The total number of FTE students 
(LFTE) was entered to allow for economies or diseconomies of scale.
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Regional dummies were included to capture regional fixed effects. 
Only East (E) had any impact and was left in the final regression.
We were particularly interested in the impact of the average SAT 
score of entering freshmen as an index of institutional selectivity 
(SEL). Selectivity may influence earnings in several ways: it may raise 
the amount of learning, hence the acquisition of general human capital 
at the institution through the peer group effect; it may be an informa 
tional signal to employers about the probable aptitude of individual 
students (a version of the screening hypothesis); and students from a 
more selective institution may benefit from its prestige or from the 
social network that it generates.
Higher Educational Experience
While in college the student makes a number of choices—concern 
ing major, curriculum, how hard to work to obtain a high GPA, and 
whether to proceed to a postgraduate degree. How do these choices 
influence future earnings? We examine the impact of choosing majors 
in Engineering (ENG), Business (BUS), Humanities and Fine Arts 
(HUM), Social Science (SOCSCI), Math plus Physical Science 
(M&SCI), Biological Science (BIO), Health Professions (HEALTH), 
and all others (OTHER), relative to education, the omitted category. 
The choice of major influences the range of occupational options that 
will be open to a student later in life; therefore we would expect some 
of these dummies to be positive and others to be negative. We also 
included the number of college math credits and Math GPA; our final 
specification uses the interaction of these two terms (MATH*GPA). 
Finally, we introduce the college GPA as an independent variable, on 
grounds that this may signal cognitive skills and traits such as disci 
pline and perseverance, to the employer. Postgraduate degrees are bro 
ken down into MA and all others (HIDEG); the latter, in particular, is 
expected to have a positive effect.
Background Characteristics
A voluminous literature documents the fact that family background 
and prior academic achievement strongly influence future earnings, 
much of this operating through their impact on the choice of college
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and probability of completing college. We would expect background 
effects on earnings to be much smaller in this study, where everyone 
has a college degree and characteristics of the college are explicitly 
included. However, some background variables may still be important, 
in part because they serve as proxies for unobserved productivity- 
enhancing student characteristics such as ambition, learning acquired 
in the household, and access to labor market information. Including 
these variables should therefore increase the explanatory power of our 
model and reduce the potential bias in the estimated coefficients of the 
college variables with which they may be correlated. Student back 
ground variables included as controls were race or nationality 
(BLACK, BLK-SOUTH, HISP), religion (CATH, JEW), parental 
income (FAMINC), father's education (FAED), attendance at Catholic 
high school (CATHHS) and other private high schools (OTHPVT), 
percentile rank in high school (PRANK), a dummy for playing a lead 
ership role in high school newspaper, student government, or athletics 
(XCURR), and the individual's verbal plus mathematics SAT score or a 
transformation of ACT scores into SAT (SAT). (For the method used to 
convert ACT to SAT, see Astin 1971.)
Labor Market Experience
While our focus is on undergraduate education, in some equations 
we control for a host of basic market variables that influence earnings: 
total months of employment since degree (EXP), tenure on current job 
(TEN), weeks worked in 1985 (LWW), hours worked per week (LHW, 
which we treat as a two-part spline allowing for the possibility that 
returns per hour may differ for hours worked under or over 35 per 
week), and a dummy for career interruptions that exceeded one year 
(INTERR). Marital status and number of children in 1985 were 
included as variables that might influence unobservable labor market 
choices such as effort.
Specification Problems and Alternative Models
A problem that always arises in the school effects literature con 
cerns biases that may be introduced by unobserved elements of student
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and institutional characteristics, and by the endogeneity of elements of 
some college and labor market variables. For example:
1. The omission of some institutional characteristics may understate 
the total college effect. We deal with this problem by including a 
dummy variable for each college, which captures its full observable 
and unobservable characteristics in the fixed-effects model.
2. The correlation between unobserved student characteristics and 
observed institutional characteristics may bias the college effect. Sup 
pose that, as a result of student choice and college admissions proce 
dures, ambitious, hard working students end up in colleges with a high 
selectivity index and expenditure rate. These colleges would appear to 
increase the earnings of their students, whereas actually they were sim 
ply choosing students who would have earned a lot anyway due to their 
ambition. We have tried to minimize this problem by including numer 
ous observable student variables (such as high school rank and extra 
curricular activities), and college experience variables (such as curricu 
lum and GPA) that may be correlated with and therefore proxy the 
unobserved characteristics. In some equations, we used instrumental 
variables for SEL and LXPS.
3. Some colleges may have policies that induce their students to 
enter remunerative majors and to acquire postgraduate degrees (for 
example, these colleges may not offer low-paid education majors, may 
require math, and may help their students gain entry to graduate and 
professional schools). If so, controlling for the higher educational vari 
ables understates the college effect. We deal with this problem, in part, 
by running our regressions with and without the higher educational 
variables. If college policies determine curriculum choice, the college 
effect on earnings should decline when curriculum is controlled.
4. The effect of the higher educational experience variables may 
also be biased by their correlation with unobserved student characteris 
tics; e.g., students who choose to take math courses may be smart and 
hard working and hence earn high wages because of these characteris 
tics, not because of the skills they acquired while taking math. We con 
sidered using two-stage techniques here, but it is difficult to find 
instruments that are clearly exogenous, can confidently be excluded 
from the wage equation, and are good predictors of curriculum choice. 
Thus, we have not been able to eliminate the possibility that the large
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effects found for the college experience variables are due, in part, to 
their correlation with unobserved student attributes.
5. Similar specification problems could be outlined with respect to 
the labor market variables.
Despite all these limitations, we believe that a clear picture does 
emerge of the impact of college characteristics and college experience 
variables, since our basic results are robust with regard to the various 
specifications explored.
College Effects
Tables 1 and 2 present our estimate of logged annual earnings for 
1985 (LY 85) as a function of college characteristics (X2) and higher 
educational experience (X3), in some cases controlling for student's 
background (X,), which precedes college, and labor market choices 
(XJ, which follow college. Lifetime earnings would obviously have 
been a preferable but unavailable dependent variable. Our indicator of 
earnings seven to nine years after college is a much better indicator 
than starting wages, which have sometimes been used in studying 
school effects.
We present a series of equations that starts with X2 and sequentially 
adds Xi, X}, and X4. Table 1 uses fixed college effects and is based on a 
subsample of 1,107 students in 285 colleges with two or more students. 
Table 2 uses OLS with observable college characteristics in place of 
the institutional dummies and is based on the full sample of 1321 stu 
dents and 499 colleges. In addition to giving the individual variables, 
we also calculate the proportion of variance explained by the individ 
ual, institutional, higher educational experience, and labor market vari 
ables as a group. When all the variables are included, we are able to 
explain over half the variance in earnings of this cohort of college 
graduates.
Fixed Effects
Column (1) of table 1 presents a "gross output" fixed-effects model 
that replicates "what the world sees." Each college is represented by a
121
Table 1. 1985 Annual Earning Regressions for Males with Fixed College 
Effects Explanatory Power of Groups of Variables 
(2+ sample)
College + College + 
College College + background + background + 
dummies background LM LM + higher ed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R2













Higher ed. exp. .053J
NOTES: Each regression is estimated for a sample of 1,107 males from the High School Class of 
1972 who eventually received a bachelor's degree, from 285 colleges, each of which had two or 
more students in our sample, 
a. Significant at .1% level 
b. Significant at 1% level 
c. Significant at 5% level
Background variables that were significant in at least one equation in Tables 1 or 2 are family 
income, SAT score. Black, Black*South interaction. Catholic, Catholic H.S., other private high 
school. See text for other background variables that were included.
Labor Market variables are experience, tenure on current job, log weeks worked last year, hours 
worked per week, marital status, number children, career interruption.
Higher Education variables are dummies for different majors (Business, Engineering, Math-Sci 
ence, Humanities, Social Science, Biology, Health Science, Other, Education as omitted cate 
gory), GPA, Math*GPA, MA degree, higher degree.
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Table 2. Annual Earnings Regressions for Males with Observable 










































































































Table 2 (continued). Annual Earnings Regressions for Males with 
































































NOTES: Each regression is estimated for a sample of 1321 males from the High School Qass of
1972 who eventually received a bachelor's degree from 499 colleges. See Table 1 for significance
levels and other variables that were included in regressions.
a. Significant at .1% level
b. Significant at 1% level
c. Significant at 5% level
d. Significant at 10% level.
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dummy that captures its fixed effect. Consistent with conventional wis 
dom, the college that a student attends makes a significant difference in 
this model, explaining 33 percent of the variance. This specification 
maximizes the college effect, since it subsumes both observable and 
unobservable college characteristics (including 285 dummy variables) 
and does not control for anything else.
Of course, much of this effect stems from the background of the stu 
dents, which is not randomly distributed across colleges. Thus, in col 
umn (2) we include both institutional dummies and student 
background, in an effort to measure "value added" by the college. 
Although the proportion of variance explained by the college dummies 
declines (to 29 percent), their effect remains highly significant. In col 
umn (3) we enter the basic labor market variables, and column (4) adds 
the higher educational experience variables. As discussed above, these 
explanatory variables may in part be capturing college policies or cor 
related student characteristics that determine earnings. Therefore, their 
inclusion should increase the explanatory power of our model and at 
the same time decrease the apparent college effects. Indeed this is what 
happens. In the last equation, the fixed college effects as a group 
explain only 16 to 17 percent of the variance in earnings, half of the 
original amount, and given the large number of degrees of freedom 
used up, this is no longer significant. For reasons given earlier, we 
believe the "true" size of the effect is smaller than that in equation (1), 
but larger than that in equation (4); i.e., it explains between 17 and 29 
percent of the variance in earnings and is marginally significant.
Observable College Characteristics
Table 2 replicates these results using observable college characteris 
tics in place of the separate dummy variables for each institution. 
These equations attempt to ascertain where the college effect is coming 
from. We are not very successful in that regard, since the observed 
characteristics as a group explain only 1 to 2 percent of the variance in 
earnings, once other variables are controlled.
Column (1) includes college characteristics only, and column (2) 
adds family background. Column (3) is closest in spirit to earlier esti 
mations by Wachtel (1976), Solmon and Wachtel (1975), and Reed and 
Miller (1970), and our results are similar (positive but small college
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effects)—increasing our confidence in these findings. The differences 
in our overall conclusions, then, stem from the richer set of variables 
we have been able to use. When both higher educational experience 
and labor market variables are included, as in column (4), neither the 
individual college characteristics nor their sum has a significant effect.
To the extent that observable college variables matter, it appears that 
characteristics associated with size, control, and possibly student body 
composition matter most. A doubling in enrollments increases earnings 
4 to 6 percent, an indication of economies of scale in producing future 
earnings that may stem from greater program variety (enabling better 
student-major matches) or from greater visibility and access to labor 
market information. We obtain ambiguous results on the advantages of 
attending a private college, consistent with our ambiguous predictions: 
this has a positive effect (of 10 to 13 percent) in the East (where private 
colleges have long-standing labor market connections), but not in the 
rest of the country. As expected, SEL has a positive effect in columns 
(l)-(3)—a 100-point increase in SAT of freshman class increases earn 
ings 3 to 5 percent)—but its size declines and significance disappears 
when higher educational experience and labor market variables are in 
the equation, as in column (4).
In contrast to the college variables that matter, expenditure per stu 
dent (LXPS) has a small coefficient that is never close to significance. 
This contradicts Wachtel's earlier finding but is consistent with Morgan 
and Duncan's (1979) and with much of the literature on primary and 
secondary school effectiveness.
We thought that the high-spending institutions might be universities 
that allocate much of their resources to graduate programs and 
research. To test this possibility, we tried specifications in which LXPS 
was interacted with Ph.D.-granting or Research Type I universities 
and/or dummies added for Ph.D.-granting institutions, research institu 
tions, and percentage of graduate students. The interaction terms were 
always negative, and the main LXPS effect became more positive (or 
less negative), but nothing we did ever made it significant. Apparently 
research and graduate programs do not increase or decrease future 
undergraduate earnings, and they also do not explain the unimportance 
of LXPS. We obtained similar results when instructional expenses, fac 
ulty salaries, and S/F ratios were used instead of LXPS. Based on the
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experience of this sample, it appears that attending a higher-spending 
college is not the way to increase future earnings.
Alternative Specifications
Because these negative findings about selectivity and expenditures 
per student run counter to the conventional wisdom, we explored alter 
native specifications to see whether and under what conditions positive 
effects might emerge (see table 3).
1. We attempted to deal with the endogeneity problem by using 
instrumental variables to predict the selectivity of a student's college; 
the predicted selectivity value was then used in place of the actual 
value in column (1). We did the same for expenditures per student. The 
coefficients on SEL and LXPS rise when instrumental variables are 
used, but neither equation changes our basic conclusion that LXPS is 
always insignificant, and SEL is insignificant when higher educational 
experience and labor market variables are in the equation.
2. We considered the possibility that multi-collinearity among col 
lege characteristics was hiding the true significant effect of SEL, so we 
omitted all other institutional variables from the equation. We did the 
same for LXPS. As expected, the size of the SEL and LXPS coeffi 
cients increased in these specifications, but they remained insignificant 
when higher educational experience and labor market variables were 
both in the equation; and, of course, the total college effect declined.
3. Finally, we interacted SEL (and LXPS) with several student, col 
lege, higher education, and occupational variables to ascertain whether 
our uniform-effects model is understating the true effect (e.g., see 
Summers and Wolfe 1977). Perhaps SEL (or LXPS) has a higher pay 
off to students with higher SAT scores, or for those entering science 
majors, professional or managerial occupations, or going on to higher 
degrees. In general these interaction terms were insignificant. We con 
clude that if an interactive model is appropriate, these data are simply 
not strong enough to detect it.
Through all these specifications, our best estimate remains that the 
college a student chooses does make a marginal difference, that this 
difference becomes insignificant as additional explanatory variables 
are added to the model, and that only a very small fraction can be 
ascribed to college characteristics readily observed and measured.
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Notes! Columns (1) and (2) use instrumental variables to predict SEL and LXPS, respectively, 
and then use the predicted values in place of the actual values. The full equation includes Col 
lege Characteristics, Background, Labor Market, and Higher Education Experience, as in equa 
tion (4), Tables 1 and 2. Columns 3 and 4 omit all college characteristics except SEL and LXPS, 
respectively; full equation includes Background, Labor Market and Higher Education Experi 
ence.
a. Significant at .1% level, 
b. Significant at 1% level, 
c. Significant at 5% level 
d. Significant at 10% level.
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The Higher Educational Experience
Explanatory Power
While institutional characteristics do not explain a large proportion 
of the variance in earnings, other aspects of the higher educational 
experience, such as choice of major, number of math credits taken, 
GPA, and postgraduate degree matter a great deal. All of these vari 
ables are highly significant, add substantially to the R2 of the model 
and, as a group, explain 3 to 8 percent of the variance in earnings in the 
OLS regressions, more than the observable college and student charac 
teristics put together. They explain somewhat less—2 to 5 percent—in 
the fixed-effects model, consistent with the hypothesis that the higher 
education variables are determined, in part, by unobserved college pol 
icies. (See tables 1 and 2.)
Students with a higher GPA have higher expected earnings; when 
GPA increases from C to B or from B to A, annual earnings rise 7 to 8 
percent. (Also see Wise 1975.) While GPA indicates, in part, that stu 
dents have acquired specific knowledge, we prefer to think of it as a 
proxy for unobservable characteristics such as ability combined with 
inputs of time and effort, general human capital characteristics that 
also lead to higher productivity in the labor market. This interpretation 
is supported by the behavior of the student's SAT, which has a positive 
effect in equations (2) and (3) that becomes negative when GPA enters 
in equation (4). Suppose that the SAT is a proxy for academic ability or 
potential achievement, which must be combined with inputs of time 
and effort to produce actual achievement. If the combination is present 
it produces achievement in college and thereafter; but if the input of 
effort is not forthcoming in college, it probably will not be forthcoming 
at work either. By this interpretation, ability alone does not generate 
significantly higher grades or earnings; the payoff to GPA is a payoff to 
the combination of ability and effort.
The positive return to college math is also noteworthy for educa 
tional policy. Taking three additional math credits (usually one course) 
and receiving an A increases earnings 1 to 2 percent. This is not sur 
prising since math governs entry to certain highly-paid occupations
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such as engineering. (For a further discussion of the impact of math, 
see Alsalam 1989a.)
A higher degree, particularly the Ph.D., LL.D or M.D., also has a 
significantly positive effect, raising earnings 10 to 15 percent (and 
probably more at a later point in the age-earnings life cycle).
This leads us to the important issue of returns to major. Which 
majors are worth more in the marketplace—those imparting general or 
specific skills? While there are large differences in the returns to differ 
ent majors, in general we cannot say that either vocational or liberal 
arts majors have an advantage. For example, Education (which is the 
omitted category) is one of the least remunerative majors, but Engi 
neering and Business, also vocational majors, are on top, 30 to 40 per 
cent higher than Education. The Physical and Social Sciences are in 
between, 20 to 30 percent higher than the other liberal arts subjects, 
Humanities and Fine Arts.
Equilibrium Wage Differentials by Major and Social Efficiency
How are these differences in returns to majors sustainable, and 
would society be better off if students were induced to move to the 
higher-paying (and presumably higher-productivity) majors? The 
answers to these two questions are interrelated.
One well-known explanation for why this can be an equilibrium sit 
uation is that different majors lead to jobs with different combinations 
of pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits, and different students have 
different preferences between these and hence make different choices. 
(For example, this might explain the low return to Humanities majors 
and the high return to Business majors who become managers.) In this 
case the differential returns to majors reflect differential tastes, are sus 
tainable in the long run, and as long as students have accurate informa 
tion, it would not be efficient to shift more of them involuntarily into 
higher-paying majors.
A second explanation is that students differ in innate ability and/or 
work effort, that these differences lead them to choose "hard" or 
"easy" majors and to earn high or low wages. (For example, the entry 
and exit requirements are probably more demanding for Engineering 
majors than Education majors.) As a variant on this explanation, some 
majors may have "gatekeeping" courses, such as math, which some
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people find hard, others easy; those with math aptitude are more likely 
to choose these majors and to earn a rent on their scarce aptitude. 
According to this interpretation, we cannot assume that people who 
choose different courses and majors are otherwise similar in ability or 
effort or attribute their earnings differential to their choice of major or 
to specific skills they have acquired in college; furthermore, if more 
students entered higher-paying majors, they may well have lower pro 
ductivity and earnings than current students.
A third explanation focuses on the reasons why some majors are 
"hard" and others "easy" and interprets these differences as an institu 
tional response to situations where large differences in the real cost of 
training students exist across majors, and "society" believes that ability 
or effort, rather than price, should be used to ration space in high-cost 
fields in order to avoid myopic choices of majors and jobs. If price is 
the same for all programs of study (as tends to be the case at the under 
graduate level), but barriers to entry and exit vary, monetary returns 
will also vary; and this may be both sustainable and efficient. Under 
this scenario, we would expect majors with the highest training costs to 
have the greatest restrictions and hence the highest private monetary 
returns. Impressionistically, we seem to observe this relationship at the 
extremes (for example, this may explain the entry and exit difference 
between Engineering and Education), but there does not seem to be a 
good fit among fields in the middle.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have defined college quality as a multidimen 
sional concept, and this paper has concentrated on one dimension— 
value added to future earnings, a proxy for future labor market produc 
tivity. Our rich longitudinal data source has allowed us to control for an 
unusually wide range of incoming student characteristics, thereby 
yielding better estimates than previously possible of the impact of col 
lege and curriculum choice on future earnings.
Briefly, our fixed-effects model indicates that a student's choice of 
college does make a difference, explaining 17 to 29 percent of the vari 
ance in earnings. However, we are unable, using OLS, to tie this col-
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lege effect down to observable college characteristics, which, taken as 
a group, explain only 1 to 2 percent of the variance. Thus, prospective 
students and the families who make their decisions based on these 
readily accessible indicators will not be getting much pecuniary return; 
on the other hand, investing time and effort to collect information 
about the "unobservable" characteristics of colleges may pay off.
The observable characteristics, as well as the total college fixed 
effect, become insignificant once curriculum choice and labor market 
experience are included in the equation. While controlling for all these 
variables may lead us to underestimate the total college contribution, 
omitted student variables may have the opposite effect. If the former 
bias exceeds the latter, we may conclude that the true size of the col 
lege effect is greater than that in column (4) of table 1 but less than that 
in column (1) and is marginally significant. Experiments with random- 
effects models and instrumental variables did not change this basic 
conclusion.
In particular, expenditures per student never have a large or signifi 
cant effect, and college selectivity, which is widely believed to predict 
success, has effects that are both small and insignificant once other 
variables are in the equation. Findings concerning college selectivity 
cast some doubt on the screening hypothesis, since this is a logical can 
didate for employers to use as a proxy for ability. According to these 
results, they do not do so.
In contrast to the limited effects of college choice, what a student 
does while in college (which is presumably related to the human capi 
tal acquired there), strongly affects future earnings, even after all other 
variables in our model are controlled. Grades, major, math courses, and 
further degree are all highly significant and, taken as a group, explain 3 
to 8 percent of the variance in earnings, more than measured college 
and student characteristics put together. This finding casts further 
doubt on the screening hypothesis.
Several caveats are in order at this point. First of all, part of the large 
effect of the higher educational experience variables probably stems 
from the unobservable productivity-enhancing student and college 
characteristics with which they are correlated, but which we could not 
capture. Second, the relative returns to different majors and occupa 
tions may change through time as a function of supply and demand, so 
it is impossible to generalize from this cohort to all cohorts. Third, the
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relative earnings of different majors and occupations may change over 
the lifetime of this cohort as a function of their training and its returns. 
For example, the doctors and lawyers in our sample had relatively little 
experience and are probably at the start of a steeply rising age-earnings 
profile, while the opposite is true for nurses and teachers.
Fourth, we have assumed uniform college effects; if a thoroughly 
interactive model is more appropriate, we may have underestimated 
college effects. (This sample is not suitable for analyzing such a 
model.) Finally, these results apply to men only; a paper on women is 
now in process, and the picture appears quite different. But at this 
point, we would have to conclude that if quality and output are defined 
in terms of future earnings and productivity, high inputs do not neces 
sarily lead to high outputs, and indeed there is no easy way to identify 
high-quality colleges.
Can it be inferred that students who spend long hours trying to get 
accepted into selective colleges, that parents who pay high tuition, and 
that colleges with large expenditures are all wasting their time and 
money? Not necessarily. As we said at the beginning, colleges produce 
many outputs, and higher future earnings is but one of them. Institu 
tions may be interested in research as well as teaching, parents may be 
interested in the cognitive development and/or value formation of their 
children, students may be interested in the social ambience of their col 
lege, and all of these may be important to society at large. Indeed, 
much of the expenditures of higher-spending institutions may be 
directed toward these other ends, some of which may have a diffuse 
long-run impact on productivity. Therefore, it is imperative to under 
take other studies with alternative output measures to get a complete 
picture of the determinants and consequences of college quality.
NOTES
1. There may be substantial multi-collinearity among these variables. We did not consider this 
a big problem since we are not trying in the paper to identify the separate effects of each student 
background variable, but rather to control them to avoid overestimating the value added by the 
college. We also included an Ftest for the joint significance of the group as a whole.
2. Switching to OLS in table 2 allows us to use the entire sample of colleges and students as 
well as to weight student differentially in order to adjust for the stratified sample design used by 
NLS and make them representative for the sample as a whole. Using the unweighted subsample to 
replicate table 2 indicates that the coefficients and significance of our variable are largely 
unchanged by the weighting procedure. We also used a random-effects or generalized least-
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squares model, to take account of the fact that all the people who attend the same school are sub 
ject to a common component and therefore have less independent variation than OLS would pre 
sume. It turned out that the variance component due to the unobserved college effect is negligible; 
the size and significance levels of some variables increase, but most are unchanged. Therefore we 
present the fixed effects and OLS results in this paper.
3. Economies of scale were also found in Cohn, Rhine, and Santos 1989, who used student 
enrollments and research as outputs; i.e., average costs fall as a composite of these outputs rises.
List of Symbols and Data Sources
College Characteristics
SEL Mean SAT Score of Incoming Freshman Class 1976. 
LFTE The log of the full-time equivalent enrollment. 
PRIV Dummy variable indicating private institutional control. 
EAST Dummy variable indicating attendance at a Northeastern 
college.
PRIV*E Dummy variable indicating attendance at a Private 
Northeastern college.
PGRAD Proportion of full-time-equivalent students who are 
graduate students.
LXPS The log of total educational and general expenditures per 
full-time equivalent student, including expenditures on 
instruction, research, public services, libraries, academic 
support, student services, institutional support, operation 
and maintenance of plant, scholarships and fellowships, and 
educational and general mandatory transfers.
LXPS*RES Interaction of LXPS and the Carnegie Classification of
Type 1 institutions. Carnegie Institution "A Classification 
of Institutions of Higher Education." 1988 p. 1.
Higher Educational Experience
MATH*GPA Total number of math, statistics, and computer science 
credits earned in college multiplied by the grade point 
average the student earned in these courses. Math credits 
are calculus level and above; i.e., precollegiate and 
collegiate math are excluded.
GPA Grade point average at first undergraduate degree-granting 
institution.
BUSMAJ Dummy variable indicating business major. 
ENGMAJ Dummy variable indicating engineering major.
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M&SCI Dummy variable indicating a physical science or 
mathematics major.
HUM Dummy variable indicating humanities or fine arts major.
SOCSCI Dummy variable indicating social science major.
BIO Dummy variable indicating a life science major.
HEALTH Dummy variable indicating a health science major.
OTHER Dummy variable for all other major except education which 
is the omitted category.
MA Dummy variable indicating receipt of a Master's degree.
HIDEG Dummy variable indicating the receipt of a Ph.D. or
professional degree above the master's level, such as law or 
medicine.
SOURCES: Riccobono, J., L. B. Henderson, G. J. Burkheimer, C. Place, J. R. Levinsohn 
National Longitudinal Study: Base Year (1972) through Fourth Follow-Up (1979) Data File 
Users Manual. Vols. 1-4 C. D. Carroll, et al., Tlie National Longitudinal Study of the High 
School Class of 1972 (NLS-72) Fifth Follow-Up (1986) Data File User's Manual. Higher Educa 
tion General Information Survey (HEGIS), 1975. Tuition and selectivity taken from Cass, James 
and Max Birnbaum, Counselors' Comparative Guide to American Colleges: 1976 Edition (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1975). Jones, C., R. Baker, and R. Borchers, National Longitudinal 
Study of the High School Class of 1972: Postsecondary Education Transcript Study Data File 
User's Manual, National Center for Educational Statistics, August 1986.
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